Signaling

Deception as Cooperation
I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly …
Preprint PDF Cite Code
Usefulness Drives Representations to Truth
An important objection to signaling approaches to representation is that, if signaling behavior is driven by the maximization of …
PDF Cite Code Project
Common Interest and Signaling Games: A Dynamic Perspective
We present a dynamic model of the evolution of communication in a Lewis signaling game while systematically varying the degree of …
PDF Cite Code
Pain Signals are Predominantly Imperative
Recent work on signaling has mostly focused on communication between organisms. The Lewis–Skyrms framework should be equally applicable …
Preprint PDF Cite
Deception in Sender-Receiver Games
Godfrey-Smith advocates for linking deception in sender-receiver games to the existence of undermining signals. I present games in …
Preprint PDF Cite
Communication and Common Interest
Explaining the maintenance of communicative behavior in the face of incentives to deceive, conceal information, or exaggerate is an …
PDF